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appeals, arguing, 
fundamental error by imposing duplicitous sentences in Docket Number 42759 in 
violation of the Idaho Constitution's protections against double jeopardy. During oral 
argument, the Court questioned whether Idaho's pleading test is still valid in light of the 
fact that I.C. § 18-301 has been repealed. Ultimately, while appellate counsel noted a 
desire to double check the Idaho Constitution's double jeopardy provisions before 
definitively answering some of the Court's questions, counsel recognized that, if Idaho's 
pleading test died with I.C. § 18-301, the double jeopardy argument in this case would 
die with it. 
However, this Court's precedent reveals that the pleading test did not die with the 
repeal of I.C. § 18-301. The pleading test is the mechanism by which violations of the 
Idaho Constitution's protection against double jeopardy are evaluated, and this Court 
held over a century ago that I.C. § 18-301 was divorced from the constitutional analysis. 
Therefore, this Court's concerns about the continuing viability of the pleading test 
should be alleviated, and it should still reach the merits of Mr. Sepulveda's double 
jeopardy argument as a result. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Sepulveda's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Supplemental 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
1 Mr. Sepulveda advanced other arguments in regard to errors in Docket Number 42758 
in his initial briefing. However, there is no need for supplemental briefing on those two 
issues. As such, this Supplemental Brief will focus only on the double jeopardy,issue. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Violated Mr. Sepulveda's Constitutional Right To Be Free From 
Double Jeopardy Under The Idaho Constitution By Entering Convictions And Imposing 
Sentences For Each Charge In The 2014 Case When One Of Those Charges Was 
Alleged As The Means By Which Each Of The Other Two Charges Was Committed 
A. Idaho's Pleading Test Survives Despite The Repeal Of I.C. § 18-301 
1. The Pleading Test Is Used To Determine Whether There Has Been A 
Violation Of The Idaho Constitution's Protection Against Double Jeopardy, 
And I.C. § 18-301 Was Expressly Divorced From The Constitutional 
Analysis 
The Idaho Constitution provides: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense." IDAHO CONST., Art. I, § 13. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held 
that the test for determining whether there has been a violation of that provision is the 
pleading theory. State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 658 (Ct. App. 2014), rev. denied. The 
Court of Appeals based that conclusion on the analysis this Court undertook in several 
of its opinions on this issue. See id. 
In State v. McKinney, for example, this Court repeatedly noted that there were 
two distinct claims at issue: (1) a violation of the federal and state constitutions' 
protection against double jeopardy, and (2) a violation of Idaho's multiple punishment 
statute, I.C. § 18-301.2 See, e.g., McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 839 (2013) ("McKinney 
alleges that his sentence violates the double jeopardy clauses of the Idaho and federal 
constitutions, as well as Idaho's multiple-punishment statute, I.C. § 18-301 (repealed 
2 Although I.C. § 18-301 had been repealed by the time the defendant in McKinney 
raised that claim, he could validly make a separate argument under that code section 
because it was the law that was in effect at the time he was convicted; he was 
challenging his 1981 conviction following a successful habeas corpus action in federal 
court. See McKinney, 153 Idaho at 840 n.5. 
3 
1 a 
or 
those sentences contravene double jeopardy principles? 
B. Was McKinney properly sentenced for the substantive crimes of murder 
and robbery in addition to the conspiracies to commit those crimes, or 
did those sentences contravene Idaho's multiple-punishment statute, 
I.C. § 18-301? 
McKinney, 153 Idaho at 840. 
While McKinney discussed the two constitutional arguments at the same time, 
the opinion also made it clear that Idaho's pleading test was distinctly different from the 
federal elements test: "At one extreme, the federal courts apply the 'strict elements' 
approach and look only to the statutory elements of the crimes charged. At the other 
extreme, courts following the 'cognate-evidence' approach examine the evidence 
actually adduced at trial. The 'pleading theory,' which Idaho has adopted, is an 
" 153 Idaho at 841. The Court considered, and 
ultimately rejected, both of Mr. McKinney's double jeopardy claims before turning, in a 
separate section of the opinion, to his claim under I.C. § 18-301. See McKinney, 153 
Idaho at 841. And, of critical note, this Court discussed the pleading theory only in the 
double jeopardy portion of opinion, not the portion dealing with I.C. § 18-301. See 
generally McKinney, 153 Idaho at 840-42. Therefore, the entirety of this Court's opinion 
in McKinney, from its structuring of the opinion to its discussion of the issues, indicates 
that the pleading theory is the test for evaluating the double jeopardy protections of the 
Idaho Constitution. 
4 
in a in V. 1 
were 
on 
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of United States Constitution and the 
Idaho Constitution. Id. at The Court concluded that, under the federal elements 
test, the two offenses were not included offenses. Id. However, applying Idaho's 
pleading theory, the Thompson Court concluded that the two charges were included 
offenses. Id. at 435 ("[T]he attempt to rob was carried out by shooting at the door of the 
victim, which was the same fact alleged in the charge of assault with a deadly weapon. 
It was alleged as the manner or means by which the robbery was attempted."). As a 
result, it affirmed the decision to dismiss one of those charges. Id. After discussing the 
constitutional protections and the pleading theory, the Court turned to look at the 
protections available under I.C. § 18-301. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 436 ("In addition, 
§ 18-301 prevents multiple prosecutions for various crimes which arise from the 
same act. There was only one act, shooting at the door of the victim. The defendant 
cannot be prosecuted for more than one crime arising from that act under I.C. § 18-
301."). Thus, the Thompson Opinion indicates that the pleading theory discussion must 
have been assessing whether there was a violation of the Idaho Constitution's 
independent protections against double jeopardy. 
In fact, Thompson reinforced this conclusion by contrasting that decision with the 
decision in State v. Horn, 101 Idaho 192 (1980). In Hom, "[t]he defendant-appellant 
also did present the broader test [the pleading theory] to the court although he did 
argue that I.C. § 18-301 precluded his being punished twice for the same act or 
5 
1 n. 
error: an 
of the information in cases reveals that in were the two 
convictions for the same offense such as to offend the prohibition against double 
jeopardy." Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435 n.5. By describing the pleading theory analysis 
as a fully separate and articulable claim directly addressing the prohibition against 
double jeopardy despite the claim under Section 18-301, Thompson further reveals that 
the pleading theory is the test for assessing whether a violation of Art. I, § 13 has 
occurred. 
This Court long recognized that I.C. § 18-301 was divorced from the Idaho 
Constitution's protection against double jeopardy: "It should also remembered, upon 
the very threshold of our investigation of this case, that our statute differs materially and 
essentially from the provision of sec. 13, art. 1, of state constitution. . . . "3 
State v. Gutke, 25 Idaho 737, 740 (1914); cf. State v. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452, 454-
55 (1996). This Court explained the distinction between the statute and the 
constitutional provision was based on the plain language of the two provisions: 'The 
constitutional provision deals with the subject of putting a defendant twice in jeopardy 
for the same offense. On the other hand, the statute (section 7230) above quoted is not 
dealing with the 'same offense,' but the same 'act or omission."' Id. (emphasis from 
original). 
3 'vVhen Gutke was evaiuating this issue, the reievant statute was codified as Idaho 
Rev. Stat. § 7230. See, e.g., Idaho Stat § 7230 (1887). That was 
subsequently recodified as I.C. § 18-301. 
6 
Accordingly this held: be remembered, the very 
in jeopardy' same are no essential 
respect applicable to the statute here under consideration."4 Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, for over a century, Section 18-301 was distinctly different than the Idaho 
Constitution's protections against double jeopardy, standing simply as an additional, 
independent protection against duplicitous sentences. See, e.g., State v. Killinger, 126 
Idaho 737, 739 ( 1995) ( describing Section 18-301 as a "statutory prohibition against 
multiple punishments for the same act"); State v. Sterley, 112 Idaho 1097, 1099 (1987) 
(describing Section 18-301 as "provid[ing] broader protection against double jeopardy 
than the State or Federal Constitution"') (emphasis added).5 
Since the pleading theory articulates the constitutional analysis, and since 
I.C. § 18-301 never informed the constitutional analysis, the fact that I.C. § 18-301 has 
been repealed has no impact on the continued viability of the pleading theory or the 
scope of Mr. Sepulveda's claim of a violation of the Idaho Constitution's double jeopardy 
provisions. 
4 Gutke's description of the constitutional protection as referring to being put "twice in 
jeopardy" reinforces the conclusion that Thompson was applying the pleading test to the 
Idaho Constitution, as it also described the protection being discussed as the protection 
against double jeopardy. Compare Gutke, 25 Idaho at 740, with Thompson, 101 Idaho 
435 n.5. 
5 As will be discussed in Section B, infra, the Idaho Constitution itself provides more 
protection than the United States Constitution. As such, I.C. § 18-301 provided a third 
level of protection, broader than either "the State or Federal Constitution" until its repeal. 
7 
on 
to "the same offense. IDAHO CONST., I, § 17. While Section 18-301 
provides no insight how that term is to be understood, I § 19-2312, which 
specifically refers to "offenses," does.6 See Gulke, 25 Idaho at 740 (explaining that the 
term "offense" is the critical language in Art. I,§ 13). The language in Section 19-2312 
has existed under different codifications since territorial days. Compare I. C. § 19-2312, 
with Idaho Rev. Stat. § 7926 (1887), and Idaho Crim. Prac. Act§ 411 (1863-1864); see 
also State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, _, 64 P. 1014, 1018-19 (1901) (quoting Section 
7926, revealing that it was identical to I § 19-2312). As a result, Section 19-2312 
represents how the founders of the Idaho Constitution would have understood what 
constitutes the "same offense" when they drafted Art. I, § 1 See Gutke, 25 Idaho at 
7 40; cf. State v. nru,,rc-r,n 82 Idaho 293, 303 ( 1960) ("We therefore hold, our desire 
to clear the confusion which has arisen in the premises, that pursuant to I.C. § 19-2312, 
any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that charged in the 
indictment or information, is an included offense .... ") 
Accordingly, it was to Section 19-2312, not Section 18-301, that this Court turned 
when explaining how the pleading theory operated: "Many jurisdictions have expanded 
the definition of lesser included offenses beyond the statutory theory and utilize what is 
called the 'indictment' or 'pleading' theory. Idaho has adopted this pleading approach 
6 Section 19-2312 provides: "The jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the 
comm1ss1on which is necessarily included in that with which he is in 
indictment, or of an attempt to commit the offense." I.C. § 19-2312 (2016). 
8 
by statute and case law." Id. at 433-34 (internal citations and footnote omitted). 
101 433-34 980). statute case 
as source test were § 19-2312 and 
Anderson. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 434. Thus, the fact that the understanding of the 
constitutional standard and the pleading test is reflected in I.C. § 19-2312, not I.C. § 18-
301, further reveals that the pleading theory has survived the repeal of I.C. § 18-301. 
This conclusion is borne out by the fact that this Court continues to rely on the 
pleading test years after Section 18-301 was repealed. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez-
Castro, 157 Idaho 647 (2014); State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525 (2011). In both Flegel and 
Sanchez-Castro, this Court reaffirmed the propriety of using the pleading test without 
citing I.C. § 18-301 at all. See generally id.7 Rather, Sanchez-Castro cited Flegel as 
the source of the pleading test. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 648. Flegel, in turn, 
rooted its discussion of the pleading theory in Anderson. Flegel, 151 Idaho at 529 
(quoting Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197,211 (1986) (quoting Anderson, 82 Idaho at 
301 )). Therefore, this Court's concerns about the continuing viability of the pleading 
7 Flegel was evaluating whether the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
included offense. See generally Flegel, 151 Idaho 526 (discussing IDAHO CONST., Art. I, 
§ 8). However, that does not mean Flegel is inapplicable to the double jeopardy 
analysis under Art. I, § 13: 
The test for determining whether one offense is a lesser included of 
another is the same regardless of whether the determination is being 
made to decide if a requested instruction is proper or whether the 
determination is being made for the purposes of deciding if a defendant 
can be convicted of both offenses or only one under the double jeopardy 
clause. 
Thompson, 101 Idaho at 435; cf Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho at 648 (relying on Flegefs 
discussion of the pleading theory in the double jeopardy context). 
9 
in light of I . § 1 should be it should 
Than The United States Constitution 
There is one final presumption which underpins this whole issue, and so, also 
needs to be addressed: that the Idaho Constitution does, in fact, provide greater 
protections against double jeopardy than the United States Constitution. To that point, 
Mr. Sepulveda recognizes this Court stated in Reichenberg that the Idaho double 
jeopardy provision does not be provide greater protection than the United States 
Constitution. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho at 457-59. However, it is important to note the 
framework in which the Court set its analysis of that question: "such independent 
analysis of our state constitution does not necessarily mean that this Court will reach a 
result different from the United States Supreme Court under [the relevant section of the 
Idaho Constitution]." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Thus, Reichenberg continued to 
affirm that Idaho's constitutional protections were not co-extensive with the federal 
provisions as it still called for an independent analysis under the Idaho Constitution. Id. 
What Reichenberg explained was that the difference between the state and federal 
protections does not necessarily mean the ultimate answer to whether there was a 
constitutional violation will be different under the state constitution. Id. 
Accordingly, this Court concluded that Idaho's constitution did not provide 
broader protections in Reichenberg for three reasons: (1) the language of the two 
provisions was not so different as to compel a different answer under the state 
constitution, (2) the existence of LC. § 18-301 did not compel a different answer under 
10 
§ 1 
a 
jeopardy. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho at 458-59; see a/so Berglund v. Potlatch Corp., 129 
752, 757 (1996) (making the same statement, that Idaho's protections are co-
extensive with the federal protections, in regard to a reimbursement order for reasons 
similar to the third rationale of Reichenberg). None of those rationales are applicable to 
the facts of Mr. Sepulveda's case. To the third Reichenberg rationale, improperly 
duplicitous convictions definitely constitute punishment under Idaho's understanding of 
jeopardy. See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 127 Idaho 24, 28-30 (Ct App. 1995) (finding a 
double jeopardy violation in the dual convictions for included offenses pursuant to the 
pleading test rationale). To the second Reichenberg rationale, Section 18-301 does not 
apply to the constitutional analysis, and so, has no bearing on whether the Idaho 
provides more protection this (See Section A, supra.) 
Finally, to the Reichenberg rationale, it is not the language of the state 
constitutional provision which dictates whether that provision provides more protection 
than the United States Constitution. Rather, it is "the uniqueness of our state, our 
Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence" which will justify providing more 
protections under the Idaho Constitution. See State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 4 72 
(2001 ). Furthermore, this Court has recognized that, even under the same 
constitutional provision, there may be some circumstances where the Idaho Constitution 
will provide more protection and others where it will not. See id. (explaining that, in 
some circumstances, though not all, Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provided 
11 
Idaho's double jeopardy provision 
circumstances. 
not 
mean 
additional protections in all 
In fact, this Court's own precedent reveals that there are circumstances where 
Idaho's double jeopardy protections will provide broader protections than the United 
States Constitution. See Thompson, 101 Idaho at 433-35. In Thompson, this Court 
examined the double jeopardy protections under both the state and federal 
constitutions. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 433. This Court expressly found dual 
convictions would not violate the United States Constitution because the charges did 
not amount to included offenses under the federal elements test. Thompson, 101 Idaho 
at However, applying Idaho's pleading this Court held dual convictions 
a double of the 
offending charge. Thompson, 101 Idaho 434-35. Therefore, under the circumstances 
in Thompson, the Idaho Constitution affirmatively provided more double jeopardy 
protections than the United States Constitution. 
The facts and precedent discussed in Section A, supra, show that "the 
uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence" justify 
more protections under the Idaho Constitution in cases such as Mr. Sepulveda's. See 
Donato, 135 Idaho at 472. Idaho has, since its territorial days, had the understanding 
that whether two offenses are "included offenses," whether they are the "same offense," 
is based on the way the offense is charged. See Idaho Cr. Prac. § 411 (1863-1864); 
12 
§ 7926 887); Alcorn, 64 1 8-19. authors 
(discussing the terminology in Art. I, § 13). Idaho's courts have consistently relied on 
that understanding since at least 1901. Compare Alcorn, 64 P. at 1018-19, with 
Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433-34, and Flegel, 151 Idaho at 529. It has also 
recognized the distinction between Idaho's test and the federal test since at least 1980. 
See Thompson, 101 Idaho 433-34 (basing its decision on the 1960 opinion in Anderson, 
82 Idaho at 301 ); cf. McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841. 
There is nothing showing that those cases are manifestly wrong, unjust, or 
unwise, nor is there anything showing overruling those decisions is necessary to 
vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice, and so, the 
rule of stare decisis means that this Court should hold to those decisions. Houghland 
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, (1990). Therefore, "based on the uniqueness 
of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence," the Idaho 
Constitution should be read to provide more protections against double jeopardy than 
the United States Constitution in cases such as Mr. Sepulveda's. 
13 
§ was 
the 
pleading theory is the test evaluating whether that constitutional protection has been 
violated, Mr. Sepulveda's double jeopardy claim under the Idaho Constitution via the 
pleading theory in Docket No. 42759 remains live despite the fact that I.C. § 18-301 has 
been repealed. As such, this Court should address the merits of that claim by applying 
the Idaho pleading theory in accordance with its precedent on the matter. 
DATED this 15th day of June, 2016. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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